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Abstract 
Emotions are an important yet largely neglected aspect of scientific work. Little is known 
about their role in the constitution and maintenance of disciplines and disciplinary identities. 
We present a theoretical account of disciplinary emotions and highlight their role in 
interdisciplinary interaction, focusing on scientific imperialism. We argue that disciplines are 
institutions with epistemic and organizational aspects that come together in internalized and 
enacted disciplinary cultures and identities that provide the intentional and psychological 
background for the emergence of disciplinary emotions. These are felt in the social identity of 
a scholar for reasons that relate to the epistemic and organizational aspects of the discipline. 
In interdisciplinary interaction, disciplinary emotions – such as feelings of superiority and 
inferiority, confidence and pride, envy and jealousy, or anger and fear – motivate proponents 
and opponents of scientific imperialism alike. We propose that imperialistic disciplines such 
as economics and evolutionary biology motivate their actions by second-order judgments 
about the interdisciplinary applicability of their first-order theoretical and methodological 
principles. Finally, we suggest that the justification of disciplinary emotions in the context of 
scientific imperialism should be evaluated in terms of their adaptiveness in promoting  
epistemically desirable ventures in scientific research. 
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Introduction 
 
Emotions are an important aspect of scientific work, yet they are still largely neglected in the 
research on science. Their role in shaping scientific observation and discovery as well as the 
justification, revision and rejection of old convictions and new conjectures has nevertheless 
received some attention in sociology, philosophical epistemology, and philosophy of science, 
beginning from the early writings of Ludwik Fleck (1935, 1936)1. He argued that collective 
emotions and moods are important in scientific activity conducted by ‘thought collectives’ 
with distinct ‘thought styles’ – shared cognitive frameworks characterized by common 
research problems, evaluative standards, methods, techniques, and literary styles. Fleck, who 
believed that “there is no emotionless state or pure rationality as such” (1935, 49), suggested 
that ‘thought styles’ evoke and maintain a collective mood that “produces the readiness for an 
identically directed perception, evaluation, and use of what is perceived” (1936, 101). Recent 
research supports the view that emotions indeed have these roles in scientific perception and 
evaluation. Thus, Jack Barbalet (2011) suggests that scientific aesthetics, learned during 
training in a specific research community, guides scientific perception and gives rise to 
aesthetic pleasure when a particular research episode corresponds with the emotionally-laden 
values of the research community. Several philosophers have also highlighted the functions of 
emotions as detectors of salience and in epistemic justification (Elgin, 2008; Hookway, 2008; 
Tanesini, 2008; de Sousa, 1987). Scientists’ own descriptions of research process confirm 
these roles of emotions in science (e.g. Koppman, Cain, & Leahey, 2015). 
Yet these reflections on emotions in social cognition overlook another important way 
in which emotions are involved in scientific practice. This is their role in the production and 
reproduction of scientific disciplines and the associated disciplinary identities of scientists. 
Indeed, if we understand disciplines along the lines of Fleck’s ‘thought collectives’ with 
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distinct ‘thought styles’ as their epistemic cores, the affectivity of thought styles brings 
emotion into the heart of disciplines. 
What is important for our purposes is that emotions not only shape the internal social 
lives of disciplines, but also make a significant difference for their external relations. This is 
where interdisciplinarity enters the stage. The importance of disciplinary emotions has 
increased together with the growing stress on interdisciplinarity in research. In 
interdisciplinary collaboration, scholars from different disciplines are supposed to negotiate 
the concepts, methods, and theories applied in their joint projects. These situations trigger 
various emotions such as those that arise if some participants of an interdisciplinary project 
feel that they are treated unjustly by participants from another discipline or disciplines. 
Another set of contexts in which disciplinary emotions emerge consists of non-collaborative 
asymmetric relations characterized by intellectual or institutional expansion across 
disciplinary boundaries. Versions of such scientific imperialism include the phenomenon in 
which one discipline seeks to ‘invade’ a domain that is already ‘occupied’ by another 
discipline with it is own concepts, methods, and theories. In these encounters among 
disciplines, disciplinary emotions motivate both the proponents and opponents of scientific 
imperialism. 
We begin by analyzing the nature of disciplines, which is crucial for understanding 
the social identification of individual scholars. This background allows us to analyze 
disciplinary emotions as group-based emotions of a specific kind that are both causally and 
rationally tied to disciplinary identities. We then proceed to examine the role of different 
disciplinary emotions in interdisciplinary interaction, and in scientific imperialism in 
particular, elucidating the situations in which these emotions emerge and the kinds of 
behavior they motivate. We suggest that the internal justification of imperialistic disciplinary 
emotions as motivational forces derives from the epistemic core of the discipline that contains 
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second-order judgments about the superiority or some other special expediency of the 
imperialistic discipline in relation to others. However, the rational justification of such 
disciplinary emotions – as well as those that are prompted in the target disciplines of scientific 
imperialism -- depends on their adaptiveness in promoting epistemic progress in scientific 
inquiry at large.  
 
 
1. What are disciplines? 
 
There is a wide agreement on the nature of disciplines as normative institutions whose two 
main aspects, the epistemic and the organizational, always go together (Mäki, 2013). Yet 
there is a third aspect: disciplinary cultures and identities that reflect the ways in which 
members of a discipline internalize and enact its epistemic posits and social arrangements. 
Considering its epistemic aspect, a discipline is a more or less convergent system of 
concepts, methods, theories, questions, established facts, canonical convictions, standards of 
evaluation, and styles of argumentation. The ‘more-or-less’ here is to be taken literally. Some 
disciplines are epistemically and methodologically more plural and diverse than others, 
involving different schools and traditions and fashions that coexist (in peace or in conflict), as 
in the case of sociology and human geography; whereas other disciplines – especially if they 
are guided by an ideal of unity – seek to suppress diversity, with rival schools perhaps 
actively trying to undermine the credibility of each other, as was the case for instance between 
analytic and continental philosophy from early 20th century until recently. 
Epistemic rivalries within disciplines often relate to struggles for organizational 
positions, resources and power. The organizational aspect of disciplines consists of 
ingredients such as university departments, endowed chairs and other academic and 
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administrative positions, educational programs and degrees, certifications and affiliations, 
research centers and institutes, scholarly associations, conferences, and journals. Until 
recently, the structure of academic departments in many cases used to correspond – roughly –
with the structure of disciplines on a one-to-one basis. However, things are changing along 
with cuts of public funding and increased demands of cost efficiency in higher education. 
These trends have inspired another trend, that of turning departments into large 
multidisciplinary units, especially in many European universities. While this development in 
administrative structure is often justified in terms of promoting interdisciplinarity (on top of 
saving in administration costs), it may also serve to shake the disciplinary foundations of 
interdisciplinarity by putting pressure on the organizational autonomy of disciplines (e.g 
Radder 2010). 
If the two aspects of a discipline, the epistemic and the organizational, always coexist 
and entangle with each other, it might be futile to ask which one is primary. In part, this 
depends on the perspective we take on disciplines. From an internal perspective, the epistemic 
aspects of a discipline constitute its core even if this core is liable to change. Advances in 
theories, methods, and concepts drive the development of a discipline and motivate the 
inception of new organizational forms and forums such as conferences, associations, 
networks, and journals rather than the other way round. A discipline obviously needs some 
organizational ‘bodies’ in which its epistemic ‘mind’ can operate its two main functions of 
research and education. However, the organizational structure can be flexible as long as it 
allows for sufficient autonomy to the discipline. Evidence from studies on socialization to 
disciplinary identities supports the primacy of the epistemic aspect of disciplines as well. 
Disciplinary cultures are maintained and perpetuated by means of identification with 
disciplinary norms and ideologies that transcend the organizational settings of academic 
departments (Parry, 2007; Henkel, 2000).  
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Exploiting the resources of Raimo Tuomela’s (2007) theory of social ontology, we 
may characterize disciplines as social institutions with an ethos: a set of constitutive goals, 
values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give scholars both 
motivating and justifying reasons for their disciplinary activities. The constitutive ethos of a 
discipline consists of a distinct set of epistemic and methodological principles, standards, 
norms, and values that the members of the discipline seek to satisfy and promote in their 
activities as group members affiliated with a discipline. Disciplines host several organizations 
such as university departments, research institutes, or academic societies, and their particular 
members occupy task-roles such as a professor or a president in those organizations. Yet it is 
sometimes possible to conduct disciplinary research (in some disciplines) even without 
occupying a task-role in the academia by following the relevant disciplinary norms in one’s 
activities. Indeed, most leading European philosophers until the 19th century did not work at 
universities. This is one reason for not identifying disciplines with their organizational aspects 
even if some organizational structure is necessary for the maintenance and dissemination of 
the disciplinary ethos and for validating sufficient mastery among the novices. 
Another main requirement of social institutions in Tuomela’s theory is their 
collective acceptance by group members. All disciplines have some foundational norms and 
ideas on which those affiliated with the discipline more or less agree. Again, the ‘more-or-
less’ is important here. The degree of agreement varies from discipline to discipline (biology 
to economics, for example) and from some parts of a discipline to its other parts (say 
theoretical to methodological aspects). Intra-disciplinary diversity is consistent with collective 
acceptance and agreement when it is based on acknowledged complementarity, with research 
fields focusing on their sub-domains, addressing their specific problems and applying their 
distinctive techniques in harmony with one another. Or diversity can be based on rivalry and 
disagreement, when alternative perspectives are offered in competition or even in conflict 
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with one another. For example, those agreed-upon norms can be methodological and concern 
legitimate ways of making and justifying arguments, collecting evidence, forming and testing 
hypotheses, and so on, even if there are disagreements on substantial theoretical issues. If 
there is no agreement on deep theoretical convictions or on the appropriate methods of 
adjudicating disputes between different positions, we can talk about different schools with 
partly dissimilar ethoses within a discipline. Yet different schools typically share roughly the 
same domain of phenomena, research problems, and recognized classic texts that define those 
problems, and thereby the ambit of the discipline. The shared ethos of a divided discipline is 
founded on those shared problems and classic texts rather than on the present standards and 
theories. Yet, at least typically, there is a more substantial agreement on epistemic and 
methodological criteria within a discipline.  
In addition to epistemic and organizational aspects, disciplines have a third aspect 
which is often attributed to people working in the discipline. This aspect focuses on the ways 
in which scholars internalize and enact the epistemic posits and social arrangements of their 
discipline. Disciplinary culture comprises epistemic and methodological commitments of the 
discipline, but also material practices of disciplinary work and social relations of knowledge 
production in and through which this work is conducted (Schoenberger 2001). All these 
aspects of disciplinary culture are reflected in a sense of a disciplinary identity in terms of 
which we understand who we are and what we do in the academic world. Together, 
disciplinary culture and identity provide an intentional and psychological background for the 
emergence of what we propose to call disciplinary emotions; pride and fear, envy and 
jealousy, confidence and insecurity, feelings of disciplinary superiority and inferiority, and 
other similar emotions that are experienced as members of a discipline on specifically 
disciplinary grounds. Emotions contribute to the process of disciplinary socialization in 
interaction with senior colleagues and peers in seminars, workshops and conferences in ways 
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that Collins (1998) has analyzed in detail. Consequently, emotions become rational responses 
to events that are significant from the perspective of the disciplinary identity. The rationality 
of emotions must here be understood in a Davidsonian sense that refers to their forming a 
coherent and holistic pattern with an agent´s attitudes and other responses, rather than their 
being mediated by reason or reasoning. 2 
 
 
2. What are disciplinary emotions?  
 
We next analyze disciplinary emotions as emotions that are felt in the social identity of a 
disciplinary scholar. Disciplinary emotions are emotions felt for reasons that rationally –
again, in a Davidsonian sense – relate to the epistemic or organizational aspects of the 
discipline. The reasons for disciplinary emotions are grounded in the disciplinary ethos, for 
instance when we evaluate our academic work in research or teaching, or that of our 
disciplinary colleagues. We feel happy and proud of our (either personal or joint) academic 
successes; sad and disappointed at our (likewise, personal or joint) academic failures; 
ashamed if we fail to live up to the core values of our discipline; angry at colleagues who 
violate those values; and so on. In addition to providing motivating reasons for these 
emotions, the disciplinary ethos also gives justifying reasons for those emotions within the 
disciplinary community. However, disciplinary emotions can be felt for organizational 
reasons as well. Thus, we are shocked if we learn that our university plans to discontinue 
teaching and research in our discipline, or to reduce its resources substantially, or merge our 
discipline into a larger academic unit in which its autonomy is seriously jeopardized. 
Disciplinary emotions can be either private or shared with others, depending on the 
context.3 These emotions are typically adopted and reinforced in social contexts – lectures, 
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seminars, conferences, and debates, both formal and informal – where they are shared with 
disciplinary colleagues. Collective enthusiasm, admiration, awe, or some other positive shared 
emotion is experienced when a scholar in a public presentation succeeds in presenting 
perceptibly original ideas building on previously established research and theorizing. If the 
presenter fails in this task, in spite of having raised expectations in the audience, the resulting 
shared emotion is negative; disappointment, dejection, indignation, or annoyance. Examples 
of private disciplinary emotions include those that we experience as peer reviewers of article 
manuscripts and research proposals, for instance; or in general reading scholarly works in our 
field. We are impressed if the manuscript, research proposal, or monograph meets the 
disciplinary criteria of excellence particularly well, and irritated or disappointed if it fails in 
light of the same criteria (and especially irritated when it pretends to excel).4 
Another important distinction in disciplinary emotions concerns their intentional 
objects. Some disciplinary emotions are felt about the actions of disciplinary colleagues that 
are evaluated on disciplinary grounds. For instance, admiration, awe, and envy of a new 
theoretical insight or empirical finding in one’s field presuppose understanding and 
appreciation of the relevance and epistemic value of the discovery, and this understanding 
emerges from the disciplinary ethos. An additional reason for envy in contrast to admiration 
and awe is the fact that someone else presented the new insight or finding, which may appear 
to imply one’s inferiority to the other researcher. The involvement of this personal reason 
does not prevent envy from being a disciplinary emotion because the goal of being given 
credit for success in one’s field is part of one’s disciplinary identity even if this goal is shared 
across all disciplines. Other disciplinary emotions are felt about other disciplines and/or their 
representatives. These emotions focus on the theories and world views, research styles and 
techniques, financial resources and academic prestige of those other disciplines. For instance, 
it has been argued that economists envied and emulated the mathematical methods of 
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physicists that they perceived to be superior to the methods of their own discipline, whereas 
other social scientists have later envied economics for similar reasons (Mirowski, 1992). 
Emotions of this kind are important in the context of scientific imperialism. 
Finally, not all emotions felt in academia are disciplinary. Disciplinary identities are 
subcategories of academic identities whose constitutive values, norms, standards, and 
conventions transcend disciplinary boundaries. Accordingly, disciplinary emotions are a 
subcategory of academic emotions felt in the social identity of an academic. For instance, 
some criteria in terms of which the activities of professors are evaluated are the same across 
disciplines and pertain to their role and academic identity as professors. Consequently, 
emotions about how individuals meet the demands of the non-disciplinary aspects of their 
academic identity are not disciplinary even if those emotions are pervasive in academia. For 
instance, all faculty members may feel angry and irritated about their increased administrative 
tasks after a poorly planned administrative reform. Regardless of how intense these emotions 
are, they are not disciplinary insofar as their motivating reasons are not disciplinary. Another 
important group of non-disciplinary academic emotions are those that relate to power 
relationships and hierarchies within disciplinary communities, such as processes of inclusion 
and exclusion from an academic conversation or career (Bloch, 2012). Important as these 
emotions are, they are more or less similar in all disciplines, and therefore generally academic 
rather than disciplinary. A major shortcoming of previous research on emotions in the 
academia has been its inability to distinguish disciplinary emotions felt in the social identity 
of a disciplinary scholar from other academic emotions. 
 
 
 
 
 11 
3. Disciplinary emotions in imperialist interdisciplinary relations 
 
Interdisciplinary interaction is an important context for disciplinary emotions. We now move 
on to examining the role of disciplinary emotions in interdisciplinary relations, and in 
scientific imperialism in particular. Imperialistic contexts are characterized by dimensions 
such as disciplinary superiority and inferiority, centrality and marginality, upgrading and 
downgrading, dominance and autonomy, hegemony and subjugation, admiration and scorn, 
neglect and engagement, intrusion and resistance, expansion and protection, unification and 
separation, and various asymmetries in cognitive and other resources. We distinguish between 
disciplinary emotions typically felt by scientific imperialists, such as feelings of pride, 
superiority, and confidence; and disciplinary emotions typically felt by those in the 
imperialized fields and disciplines, such as feelings of fear, inferiority, jealousy, envy, 
humiliation, and anger. We analyze situations in which these emotions emerge and the kinds 
of behavior they motivate in the context of scientific imperialism. 
Status and resource asymmetries among disciplines are a common source of 
emotional tensions in interdisciplinary collaborations. Natural and life sciences generally 
enjoy higher status than social sciences and humanities for reasons that seem obvious to some 
and contestable to others. These asymmetries influence the work of interdisciplinary research 
teams even if they operate under the rhetoric of mutuality, reciprocity, and exchange. Social 
scientists and humanists may feel subjugated and weak as they typically need to learn more 
about the disciplinary perspectives of life scientists than these will learn about the viewpoints 
of social scientists and humanists (see Callard & Fitzgerald 2016). For example, social 
science and humanities researchers working in medical faculties have been forced to adjust to 
the research evaluation criteria of medical research that significantly differ from their own 
disciplinary standards, with ensuing feelings of frustration, despair, and alienation (Albert et 
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al., 2014). Feelings of subjugation may also emerge from scientific subordination in which a 
discipline or field co-opts the explanatory and empirical practices of another discipline (or its 
individual researchers) to service its own supposedly more productive theories (MacLeod, this 
volume). Further still, natural scientists (and economists among the social scientists) enjoy a 
higher prestige in society as politicians and policy makers tend to seek their advice in 
practical problems that have technical and measurable dimensions, however richly social 
these problems otherwise might be. Facing these asymmetries of prestige and power, social 
scientists and humanists can either respond with anger, trying to achieve more recognition for 
their substantial efforts and contributions as Rabinow (2009) suggests, or, if they take a more 
pragmatic approach as Callard and Fitzgerald (2016) recommend, acquiesce in their 
subjugated position, experiencing occasional “sadomasochistic” pleasures in it. Both choices 
come with disciplinary emotions of different kinds. 
A most consequential context of disciplinary emotions in interdisciplinary interaction 
is expansionist scientific imperialism. One way for it to begin is when one discipline seeks to 
explain phenomena that are perceived to belong to the domain occupied by another discipline. 
‘Belonging’ and ‘occupying’ are not easy concepts to analyze, but roughly, the idea is that the 
identity of many disciplines is partially constituted by having certain types of phenomena in 
their explanatory purview on historical grounds, their having made regular attempts to explain 
those phenomena, or at least having them programmatically on their explanatory agenda, by 
including them in the scope of the discipline. Therefore, one discipline’s attempt to expand 
the applicability of its methods, concepts, or theories to explain phenomena in another 
discipline’s domain can be perceived as unwelcome intrusion across disciplinary boundaries, 
especially if the expanding discipline defines the new domain in its own disciplinary terms, 
suggesting that the domain ‘belongs to’ its ‘territory’. This kind of activity can be described 
as a form of scientific imperialism: imperialism of scope. In its weakest and apparently most 
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innocent form, imperialism of scope amounts to domain-only imperialism in which an 
imperialist discipline merely seeks to explain phenomena in domains that belong to other 
disciplines, without any attempt to change the ways of inquiry in these disciplines. In the 
more intrusive and far-reaching forms of imperialism, those of style or of standing, the 
targeted discipline itself – its principles and practices, or its status – is challenged more 
seriously, by transferring or imposing the research styles and strategies of the imperialistic 
discipline on other disciplines, and/or by appropriating the academic resources of the 
imperialized disciplines (Mäki 2009, 2013). One would expect the latter two forms of 
imperialism to trigger the strongest emotional responses, among scientific imperialists as well 
as among the practitioners in the imperialized disciplines.     
 
 
Disciplinary emotions of the imperialists 
 
Scientific imperialism associates with feelings of confidence, superiority, and pride in the 
discipline’s theories, methods, and research styles, especially in relation to other disciplines, 
among its adherents. The feelings of confidence and superiority may have multiple sources. 
Thus Marion Fourcade and her co-authors (2014) argue that the perceived superiority of 
economics springs from sources like these: (1) its relative insularity as a discipline and its 
dominant position within the network of social sciences; (2) a pronounced hierarchy within 
the discipline, especially in comparison with other social sciences; (3) changing networks of 
affiliations of economics in consequence of which economics has reoriented towards finance; 
and (4) the material situation, worldviews, and social influence of economists that have set 
economists apart from their academic peers. These factors reinforce each other such that the 
“position of social superiority breeds self-confidence, allowing the discipline to retain its 
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relative epistemic insularity over time and fueling a natural inclination towards a sense of 
entitlement” (2014, 2).  
Focusing on epistemic sources of superiority that belong to the disciplinary ethos, 
economists believe that their discipline is the most scientific among social sciences by virtue 
of its mathematical methods that are more reliable and intellectually demanding than the 
methods of other, less formal, social sciences. With this pride in the superiority of their 
discipline, economists “are less likely to feel the need to rely on other disciplines or even 
acknowledge their existence” (Fourcade & al. 2014, 6). Instead, economists are eager to apply 
their theories and methods to the study of phenomena that have traditionally belonged to the 
domains of other disciplines. In a famous defense of economics imperialism, Edward Lazear 
proudly proclaims that “by almost any market test, economics is the premier social science… 
[as] the economic toolbox can be used to address a large variety of problems drawn from a 
wide range of topics” (Lazear, 2000, 99).  
It is notable that this appeal to the “market test” establishing the supremacy of 
economics is an exercise of (higher order) economics imperialism: it applies the notion of the 
market to the justification of the interdisciplinary spread of the notion of market (together 
with other economic notions) to traditionally non-economic domains. Rather than invoking 
principles such as those of evidential support or ontic similarity, it emphasizes the influence 
of economics on others outside of economics: “The effort to extend the field measures its 
success by inducing others to adopt the economic approach to explore issues that are not part 
of classical economics” (Lazear, 2000, 104). By this criterion, the imperialist expansion of 
economics to the domains of other disciplines justifies itself! Lazear grants that other 
scientists such as sociologists, anthropologists and perhaps psychologists may be better than 
economists in identifying problems of research. However, this recognition is half-hearted as 
economics is claimed to be superior to those other disciplines in its capacity to provide 
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concrete solutions to these problems as “the parsimony of our method and ability to provide 
specific, well-reasoned answers gives us a major advantage in analysis” (Lazear, 2000, 103). 
 
 
Disciplinary emotions of the imperialized 
    
The picture is considerably different in the imperialized disciplines. Focusing here on 
externally driven intrusions (rather than internally driven importations)5, they tend to prompt 
emotions such as fear, jealousy, envy, humiliation, and anger. Jealousy derives from the fact 
that disciplines have distinct research domains that on historical grounds or otherwise appear 
to belong to the discipline. Even if jealousy is typically perceived and analyzed as an 
interpersonal emotion (e.g. Rorty, 1980; Taylor, 1988; Goldie, 2000), it may have 
organizational forms that are importantly similar to paradigmatic interpersonal cases. Just as 
interpersonal jealousy involves treating the loved one as a possession, disciplinary jealousy 
involves possessive inclinations about the discipline’s traditional or customary domain. 
Accordingly, members of a vulnerable discipline may guard the discipline’s domain and 
borders jealously against perceived or anticipated invasions from other disciplines. Jealousy 
motivates the building of symbolic and institutional walls around the discipline’s domain in 
order to keep intruding scientific imperialists away. An unintended and undesirable effect of 
such a strategy may be the rejection of innocent, non-imperialistic proposals for 
interdisciplinary collaboration as well.  
The main problem with disciplinary jealousy, as with interpersonal jealousy, lies in 
the idea of exclusive possession. Disciplinary domains cannot be owned in a literal sense any 
more than people. Tradition alone cannot give a sufficient justified reason for excluding 
researchers from other disciplines from attempting to provide alternative solutions to the 
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problems of one discipline with their own methods, theories, and concepts. In an ideal 
situation, researchers from all sides should have the right to defend their disciplinary 
approaches in an interdisciplinary debate where the best argument should win. Naturally, 
there is no guarantee that the discipline whose traditional target phenomena are being studied 
with the resources of another discipline emerges as the winner from such a challenge. 
Therefore, disciplinary jealousy – like its interpersonal counterpart – comes with a sense of 
powerlessness regarding the agent’s ability to keep actual or potential rivals away. This 
awareness generates and maintains fear and insecurity among members of vulnerable 
disciplines who feel threatened by the advances of imperialist disciplines into their field.    
The propensity for disciplinary jealousy may be associated with the permeability of 
disciplinary boundaries. Becher and Trowler (2001) suggest that disciplines differ from each 
other in this respect.  
 
Impermeable boundaries are in general a concomitant of tightly knit, convergent 
disciplinary communities and an indicator of the stability and coherence in the 
intellectual fields they inhabit. Permeable boundaries are associated with loosely 
knit, divergent academic groups and signal a more fragmented, less stable and 
comparatively open-ended epistemological structure (Becher and Trowler 2001, 60).     
  
In other words, relatively insulated, hierarchical, and methodologically or theoretically unified 
disciplines, such as economics, are capable of protecting their borders more effectively than 
more open, less hierarchical, and internally diverse disciplines. We may then surmise how 
these characteristics are related to dispositions of disciplinary jealousy. On the one hand, the 
permeability of a disciplinary border may be associated with a higher propensity for 
disciplinary jealousy because it renders the discipline chronically susceptible to external 
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influence. Yet on the other hand, and more plausibly, methodological and theoretical 
pluralism within a discipline may be an antidote against this emotion. Therefore, we may 
conjecture that the highest propensity of disciplinary jealousy is likely to be found in 
relatively convergent, methodologically unified disciplines such as anthropology whose 
domain is targeted by other equally convergent disciplines, such as economics, with their own 
allegedly superior methods.   
If disciplinary jealousy is felt in response to perceived or anticipated intrusions into a 
disciplinary domain, disciplinary envy is more often felt about issues of power and standing – 
academic and institutional resources and positions. Callard and Fitzgerald (2016), for 
instance, report the “neuroscience envy” of social scientists and humanists, focusing on power 
and resource disparities between their disciplines and the neurosciences. It is also possible to 
envy another discipline’s methods and research styles on disciplinary grounds, that is, to 
regard those of one’s own discipline as inferior to the envied discipline. An example is the 
“physics envy” of economists that according to Mirowski involves “a certain contempt for the 
history of economics, a tendency toward an uncritical appropriation of a limited range of 
mathematical formalisms, and constant intrusions by physical scientists seeking to upgrade 
the scientific status of the discipline” (1992, 61). The self-image of economists as “more 
scientific” and “more rigorous” than other social scientists derives from this emulation of 
mathematical physics that “rests almost entirely upon superficial points of resemblance 
between physics and economics” (1992, 67). Insofar as economists have successfully 
convinced others of their scientific status, their disciplinary envy has brought them a standing 
and status that members of other social science disciplines now envy in turn for the 
economists’ position as influential and highly paid experts in business and politics.  
There is another possible contemporary source of disciplinary envy that also reveals 
one of the internal tensions in contemporary science policy. The tendency of decreasing 
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public funding of research and higher education in European universities may increase 
disciplinary envy as different disciplines start perceiving each other as adversaries in zero-
sum games. At the same time, it is recognized that addressing today’s grand challenges 
requires interdisciplinary efforts, and research policies are designed to promote close 
collaborations between disciplines. The left and right hand of science policy may thus be 
pulling in opposing directions in this respect. 
  Epistemic injustice is a source of many negative disciplinary emotions that may be 
triggered in interdisciplinary situations. Miranda Fricker (2007) who introduced this term did 
not associate it with interdisciplinary interaction, but used it more generally to characterize 
the connection between social and epistemic power in the creation and maintenance of social 
meanings. She maintains that these social processes often work against those in otherwise 
marginalized positions in society, such as women and sexual and ethnic minorities. She 
distinguishes between two forms of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical and testimonial. The 
former is “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured 
from collective understanding owing to hermeneutical marginalization” (2007, 158). Fricker 
argues that hermeneutical injustice is wrong because it results in the victim’s loss of 
confidence in his or her beliefs and their justification or – in the extreme – loss of knowledge. 
Testimonial injustice has the same consequences even though it operates differently: through 
prejudice that causes a hearer to give a speaker less credibility as a knower than he or she 
deserves. 
Fricker identifies feelings of humiliation and under-confidence elicited by being a 
victim of epistemic injustice. These feelings are intelligible in the face of imbalance of social 
power between the perpetrator and the victim of epistemic injustice that render the latter 
incapable of resisting or protesting against his or her unjust treatment. Yet if we consider an 
individual in a more equal power position, we should not be surprised if she perceives 
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epistemic injustice as offence or insult, and responds with anger instead. Anger is felt in 
response to perceived offences, slights, and wrongs, as philosophers of emotion from Aristotle 
onwards have pointed out. Fricker does not mention anger as an emotional response to 
epistemic injustice, and the reason for this is that in her understanding, the socially and 
epistemically marginalized groups lack moral and epistemic resources to perceive their 
treatment as unjust in the first place.6  
The situation is different in many contexts of scientific imperialism where the 
members of an imperialized discipline often perceive the imperialists´ intrusion into their 
domain as an offence, sometimes prompting them angrily to resist it. If active resistance will 
not arise, feelings of humiliation, despair, and under-confidence are among the possible other 
responses. The Canadian social scientists and humanists who work in medical faculties are a 
case in point as testified by their dire feelings about their inability to resist the evaluation of 
their research practices, productivity, and academic excellence in terms of disciplinary criteria 
alien to them (Albert et al., 2014). These scholars are victims of testimonial injustice as they 
are evaluated by medical researchers whom they perceive to lack the expertise to soundly 
evaluate their work. Yet it seems evident that the feelings prompted by epistemic injustice 
include feelings of anger besides those of humiliation and despair. 
Disciplinary anger can be felt in interdisciplinary interaction when members of a 
discipline appraise that their discipline or disciplinary colleagues have been treated unfairly or 
harmed in some other way by members of another discipline or by administrators, funding 
agencies or structural conditions unduly favoring the other discipline. The difference between 
anger and jealousy is that the latter is felt typically when an offensive action is merely 
anticipated or conceived in imagination, whereas anger presupposes an actually experienced 
action of another party that the subject(s) of emotion appraises as an offence of some kind. 
Testimonial injustice is in operation in scientific imperialism insofar as members of an 
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imperialistic discipline seek to undermine the credibility of researchers of another discipline 
as experts in the relevant domain (Rolin, this volume). Expertise is a matter of competence in 
a particular domain, and credibility is others’ perceived view of another subject’s competence. 
Scientific imperialism in which the expertise available in another discipline is either ignored 
or regarded as categorically inferior to that of the imperialist discipline amounts to testimonial 
epistemic injustice.  
Two further observations are in order. First, different sets of disciplinary emotions 
are often associated as the two sides of a skewed imperialist coin. For example, insofar as 
scientific imperialism is motivated by disciplinary pride, it appears that anger of the target and 
pride of the proponent function as complementary disciplinary emotions. Second, the 
disciplinary emotions of both scientific imperialists and their targets are rationally grounded 
in the disciplinary ethos of the respective disciplines. The disciplinary anger of those who 
perceive themselves as victims of epistemic injustice derives from the ethos of their discipline 
that they perceive as being violated by scientific imperialists who claim to have superior 
methods or theories for studying the relevant phenomena. Likewise, disciplinary envy and 
anger are grounded in the disciplinary ethos of the imperialized disciplines as these emotions 
relate to conceptions of research styles and proper domains of disciplines.  
Besides first-order epistemic and methodological norms and strategies, the 
disciplinary ethos may include second-order judgments about the superiority of those norms 
and strategies in dealing with wider sets of phenomena or problems than those traditionally 
reserved for the discipline in an academic division of labor. Confidence in the superiority of 
the discipline’s theories and research styles can be accompanied by a Kipling principle which 
states that it is the superior discipline’s burden to bring scientific enlightenment and progress 
to other, less advanced disciplines (Mäki, 2013). Insofar as the imperialists have positive 
emotions about their first-order epistemic and methodological principles and strategies, these 
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emotions easily attach to their second-order judgments about those first-order standards as 
well. This affective investment has the potential of reinforcing the capacity of these second-
order judgments to help resist or ignore possible evidence against these judgments, thus 
strengthening scientific imperialists´ confidence in their mission. 
Economics and evolutionary biology are examples of disciplines with this kind of 
self-appointed mission: economics by virtue of its mathematical methods of modelling that 
economists regard as superior to those of other social sciences with less formal methods, and 
evolutionary psychology relying on its theoretical view that human behaviors can be 
explained as adaptations formed at the dawn of humankind (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992). In contrast to these overtly imperialistic disciplines, some disciplines and theories such 
as gender research and social constructivism can be covertly imperialistic even if they do not 
recognize this pattern due to their particularistic and subversive meta-understanding of their 
own epistemic perspective, which may let these researchers perceive themselves as victims of 
other kinds of scientific imperialism. Yet those researchers’ own imperialistic inclinations 
manifest in their confidence in expanding their analyses to ever new social and cultural 
phenomena and in their belief that these analyses are superior to the previous ones. 
     
 
4. The justification of disciplinary emotions 
 
A major philosophical question about disciplinary emotions in the context of scientific 
imperialism concerns their rational justification. Disciplinary ethos with its first-order 
epistemic and methodological norms and second-order judgments about the validity and 
applicability of those norms provides an internal justification for disciplinary emotions within 
the disciplinary community. Unfortunately, this intra-disciplinary perspective is not very 
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useful in interdisciplinary contexts. Insofar as a given disciplinary ethos is internally coherent, 
it seems capable of justifying those same emotions that we have already discussed as 
examples of disciplinary emotions in imperialistic contexts: anger at epistemic injustice 
experienced by victims of scientific imperialism, and pride of its proponents in the superiority 
of their methods and research styles. Jealousy is a borderline case because it is possible to 
criticize the belief that a discipline has a monopoly over its domain as misguided even if such 
a belief is part of the disciplinary ethos. Here we point out the possible mistake regarding 
what can and cannot be determined by a disciplinary community on the basis of an intra-
disciplinary rational consensus. 
Therefore, the justification of disciplinary emotions is not merely an intra-
disciplinary issue, but reaches beyond disciplinary boundaries. Obviously, this makes it an 
essentially harder problem to tackle. Nevertheless, the way disputes often go between 
scientific imperialists and their opponents suggests that it is impossible to avoid putting the 
issues more broadly as relational interdisciplinary issues. Are the imperialists’ feelings of 
pride, superiority, and confidence manifestations of a collective hubris (Sullivan & Hollway, 
2014) and hence categorically inappropriate versions of these feelings, involving aggression 
and narcissistic derogation or belittling of other disciplines and their members? Or are 
scholars in the target disciplines overly timid and sensitive in jealously guarding their domain, 
or in taking offence at sincere attempts to bring epistemic progress in their field? We propose 
that in answering these tricky questions one needs to consider the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, and institutional constraints on scientific imperialism that one of 
us (Mäki, 2013) has proposed elsewhere. The key idea is that in order to be acceptable, an 
imperialistic expansion or intrusion must meet these constraints.   
The ontological constraint requires that the accomplishment of scientific imperialism 
should be ontological unification of apparently diverse kinds of phenomena using the 
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theoretical and methodological resources of the imperialistic discipline. The successful pursuit 
of ontological unification is a process of discovery of real unity in the world. It is a discovery 
of facts pertaining to the extent to which the domains of different disciplines are made of 
similar components or governed by similar laws or causal mechanisms. Given that it is the 
task of science to make discoveries about the real world, it should be appropriate to try to 
unify as far as possible, regardless of whether disciplinary boundaries need to be crossed.  
The epistemological constraint derives from the acknowledgement of significant 
epistemic uncertainty in interdisciplinary trespassing. There is no perfect assurance that 
ontological unification has been achieved when attempted. Epistemic caution and humility is 
therefore required when accepting and rejecting theories and explanations of a discipline 
especially when applied to far away territories. Epistemologically appropriate imperialistic 
claims about the cross-disciplinary unity of phenomena must not hide from view the 
uncertainties involved but is rather obliged to make them visible by stating the relevant 
provisos explicitly. 
The axiological constraint gives non-epistemic values a role to play. Judgements 
about success and failure in unification must be made relative to values that express the 
human or cultural significance of the unified phenomena. Theories that manage to unify 
insignificant phenomena while ignoring or concealing significant ones are less justifiable than 
those that manage to unify significant phenomena. The concern about important human or 
cultural values that may fail to be expressed and may be suppressed as a result of scientific 
imperialism (see Clarke and Walsh 2009) is a reason for putting forth the axiological 
constraint. 
The institutional constraint is the requirement that the pursuit of cross-disciplinary 
unification must occur under the guidance of the principles of institutionally virtuous 
scientific practice. The ideal normative institutions of honorable science should advise for 
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virtues such as respectful humility and against vices like dismissive hegemonic arrogance in 
interdisciplinary relations. Such institutions prescribe a culture of critical and open-minded 
conversation sustained by suitable degrees of diversity and tolerance, and they proscribe 
against dogmatism and intellectual monopolies that are protected by non-argumentative 
means of exclusion. Scientific imperialism that engages in critical and respectful debate and 
that spells out and seeks to justify its presuppositional posits is more agreeable than one that 
marches on just by relying on the academic or non-academic standing of the invasive 
discipline. 
We are now ready to propose that the justification of disciplinary emotions in the 
context of scientific imperialism should be evaluated in terms of their adaptiveness in 
promoting epistemically acceptable cross-disciplinary unification that meets the above four 
constraints. We recognize that it may be difficult to evaluate whether a particular attempt of 
imperialistic expansion satisfies this criterion when the intellectual space is filled with 
imperialist arguments and their counterarguments. Moreover, it seems obvious that the parties 
of such interdisciplinary disputes may not be the best judges in this question when their 
disciplinary emotions run high, influencing their beliefs and evaluative judgments in ways 
that make their respective emotions appear justified for themselves in the situation. Jealousy 
in particular is notorious for influencing thinking and imagination in ways that motivate the 
subject of emotion to act on his or her emotional thoughts. Similarly, disciplinary jealousy 
may make its subjects dwell on possessive thoughts about what is perceived as a hostile 
imperialistic invasion of their discipline, thus predisposing them against all (including 
reasonable) proposals of cross-disciplinary unification or even non-imperialistic collaboration. 
In a like manner, the pride of scientific imperialists tends to influence their thinking in ways 
that support their confidence that the necessary constraints of cross-disciplinary unification 
are being met, whether or not that is actually the case.  
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Even if difficult, we believe that it is possible to give some guidelines on the basis of 
the four constraints.7 Imperialism of scope in its domain-only variety seems the most innocent 
and potentially supportable form of imperialism. No domain of phenomena is the sole 
property of any discipline, so attempts by neighboring disciplines to explain those phenomena 
should not be resisted. Accordingly, disciplinary emotions that express this kind of resistance 
such as anger, jealousy, and fear about such activity should be taken as conditionally 
warranted at most. Yet the situation is complicated by the fact that the actual justification of 
these emotions depends on whether imperialism of scope satisfies the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, and institutional constraints. Imperialism of style and standing 
are even more difficult to assess. Imperialism of style may in principle inspire the target 
discipline to self-examine and improve its methods and standards of inquiry, but it may also 
lead to an underestimation or even demolition of approaches and styles of inquiry that are 
valuable in meeting some important epistemic or human demands. Likewise, imperialism of 
standing may be based on misusing weakly justified images of academic prestige so as to 
enhance the academic or societal status of a discipline at the expense of that of another. Or, in 
some (lucky but perhaps rare) cases, it may be a way of reallocating institutional resources 
and power positions in a way that reflects the actual epistemic capacities and performances of 
the disciplines involved.  
Passing judgement on these matters is highly fallible and time-consuming. Therefore, 
it should take place in circumstances that support criticism and self-criticism, tolerance and 
pluralism, mutual respect and understanding. Disciplinary emotions should be so tuned that 
they do not prevent these considerations but rather facilitate them. The problem is that this 
kind of cognitively complex and future-oriented perspective of deliberation is difficult for 
emotions to achieve. This is because of the evolutionary function of emotions is to motivate 
spontaneous action in their eliciting situations: fleeing in fear, hiding in shame, attacking in 
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anger, and so on. It is possible to employ the motivational force of emotions to other, more 
distant purposes, but this requires their reflective regulation (Gross, 1998). 
Here the challenge is to regulate our disciplinary emotions on the basis of our 
understanding on the epistemic acceptability of particular instances of scientific imperialism. 
Our advice is to treat disciplinary emotions as “fire alarms” that detect situations where we 
have important concerns at stake but where collective reflection within the disciplinary 
community is required in order to determine whether or not the prima facie emotional 
appraisal of the situation was justified. This is not an easy task, but perhaps still feasible as the 
example of social and political movements suggests. The joint action in such movements is 
often motivated by the participants’ shared emotions, and even if these emotions fade during 
collective deliberation on the suitable course of joint action, it is possible to reinvigorate the 
emotion when an opportunity to act on the emotion emerges (e.g. Salmela & Nagatsu, 2016).   
Researchers on interdisciplinarity, philosophers of science in particular, have an 
important role to play here thanks to two advantages: they can aspire to function as neutral 
experts who do not have stakes in disciplinary disputes between scientists; and they are 
equipped with the capacity of offering diagnostic analyses of various hard cases to discern 
presuppositions that may obstruct fruitful interdisciplinary encounters. In principle at least, 
philosophers are in a position to judge whether constraints on cross-disciplinary unification 
and collaboration are being observed in actual projects of interdisciplinary transfer or 
integration. A little more elaboration is needed in the framework we have outlined here to 
help philosophers succeed in the difficult task. This is a challenge for another study. 
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5. Final thoughts 
  
In this chapter, we have presented the first theoretical account of disciplinary emotions and 
their role in interdisciplinary interaction, focusing on scientific imperialism. In many 
characteristic instances – especially those governed by externally driven intrusions – the 
situation emerges as asymmetrical. Members of disciplines targeted by scientific imperialism 
feel inferiority, jealousy, envy, humiliation, anger, and other negative emotions about their 
position, whereas imperialists enjoy feelings of superiority, confidence, and pride. We 
suggested that the justification of disciplinary emotions in the context of scientific 
imperialism should be evaluated in terms of their adaptiveness in promoting epistemically 
acceptable cross-disciplinary explanatory unification that meets the ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, and institutional constraints. Finally, we put forward an idea  
that philosophers of science may be in a relatively good position to act as neutral arbitrators 
capable of adjudicating in disciplinary conflicts about the acceptability of instances of 
scientific imperialism – and, consequently, about the justification of disciplinary emotions in 
those situations.     
We close with two final and perhaps more sanguine observations. First, our focus on 
the externally driven variants of scientific imperialism has resulted in emphasizing negative 
emotions like fear and anger within the target disciplines. Internally driven variants – acts of 
importation carried out by practitioners within the target disciplines – are likely to be 
associated, at least in somedisciplinary circles, with positive feelings of hope and excitement, 
joy and curiosity, superiority and confidence. Second, interdisciplinary interaction can take 
mutually rewarding forms as well. There is evidence that successful non-imperialistic 
interdisciplinary collaboration can produce high levels of emotional energy that imbues the 
collaborators with confidence, enthusiasm, and strength for scientific work, while reinforcing 
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their bonds of solidarity (Boix Mansilla et al., 2015; Parker & Hackett, 2012; Collins, 1998). 
Importantly, these positive emotions are intertwined with cognitive and interactional 
dimensions of research collaboration. Thus, collective excitement and joy are markers of 
establishing an intellectual common ground emerging from different disciplinary viewpoints 
as well as of the formation of shared group identities. Some positive emotions that arise in 
successful interdisciplinary interaction are not disciplinary. Instead, they are interdisciplinary 
as they reflect an expansion of the researcher’s academic identity from a disciplinary 
perspective to an interdisciplinary one that is experienced as rewarding and empowering 
(Turner et al., 2015). This finding provides a nice closing to this chapter as it highlights the 
substantial role of emotions in all forms of interdisciplinary interaction. 
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